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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article I will reflect on the past twenty years of 
trademark law and provide insight into the direction of the law as it 
continues to evolve.  The previous twenty years coincide with the 
period that Hugh Hansen has so ably directed the Fordham 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy Conference, the preeminent 
conference of its kind in the world.  In bringing together an 
amazing mix of leading scholars and practitioners from the world 
over, Professor Hansen has created a conference where one truly 
learns, debates and has fun.  To illustrate the trends of this period, I 
have chosen ten cases as frames of reference.  In this endeavor, I 
have been greatly aided by the volumes published in conjunction 
with the Fordham IP Conference.  I can think of no better way to 
track the changes that have occurred in the world of trademark and 
other areas of intellectual property law than to consult these annual 
publications. 
Top ten lists are used to enumerate an individual’s favorite 
books, movies and songs, but are also used by late night comedians 
as a basis for ridicule.  My ten-case collection is a combination of 
the foregoing.  My selections include not only positive examples of 
well-crafted case law, but also cases that, in my opinion, were 
decided incorrectly and are even subject to ridicule.  On the whole, 
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this subjective, certainly idiosyncratic choice of cases will reveal 
that United States trademark law, despite perennial grumblings 
from the academic community,1 has done a relatively successful 
job in adjusting to practical realities that trademark owners and 
consumers of brand-name goods face in an environment dominated 
by the internet and global commerce. 
In viewing these cases, I will attempt to predict the direction of 
trademark law.  In emulating a group of well-versed trademark 
scholars, who met in Cannes, France in 1992 to speculate on what 
trademark law would look like in 2017,2 I adopt a similar, but more 
modest goal and constrain my predictions to the relatively 
circumscribed.  Of course, observing the past is an easier task than 
speculating about the future, but the importance of the latter cannot 
be overstated. 
Since 1992, the increasing expansion of trademark rights has 
continued unabated.  Importantly, the attitude expressed by a large 
majority of the bench and bar has taken a positive view of 
trademark law as a system that enhances consumer welfare.  In the 
1960s and 1970s the anti-trademark sentiment viewed trademark as 
a means for creating monopoly power in favor of the trademark 
owner.3  According to this now generally outmoded view, the 
trademark system reinforces irrational consumer demand through 
artificial product differentiation and erects barriers to entry for 
other firms that may wish to compete in the product market.4  As 
one court declared, “the trademark is endowed with a sales appeal 
independent of the quality or price of the product to which it is 
attached; economically irrational elements are introduced into 
 
 1 There are many such articles written by my colleagues in academia, many of which 
are well written and bring up important issues but are clearly of the somber, even 
apocalyptic mode. See generally Ken Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark, 
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (demonstrating how trademark owners are 
increasingly using strike suits to deter market entry). 
 2 Symposium, The World in 2017, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 842 (1992).  
 3 I have elaborated the concept of monopoly phobia in Marshall Leaffer, Sixty Years 
of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of Monopoly Phobia, in U.S. INTELL. PROP. 
LAW & POL’Y 85 (Hugh Hansen ed., 2005). 
 4 See e.g., A.G. Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. Rev. 
503 (1956). 
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consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from the 
normal pressures of price and quality competition.”5 
This anti-trademark stance was not limited to the courts; 
government policy toward trademarks expressed the same view.  
Most conspicuously, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
considered compulsory licensing of trademarks as a means to 
eliminate monopoly power in companies that enjoyed ownership of 
strong marks.6  At that time, the FTC promoted governmental 
intervention in circumstances in which trademarks and brand 
promotion were thought to be a barrier to competition. 
Trademark skepticism waned toward the end of the 1970s, but 
continued until the passage of the Federal Anti-Dilution Act in 
1996.7  Since the 1980s, the prevailing view believes in a strong 
trademark system based on a property rights model—in short, the 
protection of goodwill—that improves competition and consumer 
welfare.  One can look to three developments that progressively 
led to doctrinal change in the law of trademarks.  The first is “the 
new economic learning,” which established the competitive 
benefits of product differentiation and emphasized the fundamental 
role of trademarks as a means of reducing search costs to the 
consumer.  The second impetus affected the manner in which 
goods are sold in a global market place.  A third stimulus for 
change was the push toward harmonization of intellectual property 
worldwide, as exhibited in the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement.8  Together, these 
influences have led to an expanded concept of property rights in 
trademark law based on the protection of goodwill embodied in the 
trademark, and have all but eliminated the trademark monopoly 
phobia.  This property-rights oriented standard will shape the 
future of trademark law. 
 
 5 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 6 See RICHARD CRASWELL, FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, 
TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER INFORMATION, AND BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 2 (1979); In re 
Borden, Inc., 92  F.T.C. 669 (1978). 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 8 As part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States was a major 
promoter of the TRIPS agreement.  
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Put yourself in the shoes of a trademark practitioner or scholar 
in 1992.  It was a different world then;9 one that was to change 
radically through the TRIPS Agreement, a new dilution statute, 
and the United States’ entry into the Madrid Protocol.  Focusing on 
my ten-case collection, I will illustrate the driving forces that 
shaped trademark law and the remarkable developments that 
occurred over this two-decade period, and speculate on what the 
future might bring to this area of law. 
NUMBER 10: THE EVER MORE COMPLICATED PREDICAMENT OF THE 
TRADEMARK PRACTITIONER 
In re Bose Corp.10 
The job of a trademark practitioner has gotten progressively 
more difficult during this twenty-year period.  This change is 
exemplified in the ballooning number of trademark applications 
over the past twenty years.  For example, in 1992 there were 
125,237 applications for registration;11 in 2011, that number rose 
to 398,667.12  During the same period, renewal applications rose 
from 6,355 to 49,000.13  These statistics suggest that trademark 
selection has become increasingly important and that successfully 
clearing marks has never been more difficult.  Further, they 
demonstrate that simply keeping up with a multitude of 
applications, registrations, and renewals in today’s world is a 
daunting task, and one that is further compounded on an 
international level. 
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In 
re Bose Corp., recognized the practical difficulties of those on the 
 
 9 There was concern about how to handle domain names.  It was not until a few years 
later that the Uniform Domain Name Dispute-Resolution Policy resolved that problem.  
 10 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 11 Table 16: Trademark Applications Filed for Registration and Renewal and 
Trademark Affidavits Filed, USPTO.COM, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/ 
2007/50316_table16.html (last modified Dec. 21, 2007). 
 12 Table 17: Trademark Applications Filed for Registration and Renewal and 
Trademark Affidavits Filed, USPTO.COM http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/ 
oai_05_wlt_17.html (last modified Jan. 3, 2012). 
 13 Id. 
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front lines of trademark practice and conformed the standard for 
fraud of the Trademark Office to the patent law standard for 
inequitable conduct.14  In the case, Bose Corporation registered the 
mark WAVE for various products including audio tape recorders 
and players.15  Bose renewed the marks in 2001 for the same list of 
products, although it had not sold audio tape recorders and players 
since 1997.16  The court reiterated that “[a] third party may petition 
to cancel a registered trademark on the grounds that the 
‘registration was obtained fraudulently.’”17  In short, a “should 
have known” standard for a false statement of fact in an 
application is no longer sufficient to sustain a claim for fraud either 
for a patent or a trademark filing.18  To succeed on a claim for 
fraud, a litigant must show that the filed affidavit contained false 
statements of material fact that were submitted with the intent to 
deceive.19 
The key question is: what one must prove to meet the 
inequitable standard?  Establishing falsity and materiality is 
straightforward; however, the evidence required to show that a 
statement was made with intent to deceive is far from apparent.  
Does inequitable conduct exist where a person who makes a 
statement later found to be false can show a reasonable, factual 
basis for his or her belief that the statement is true?  These 
questions will plague the courts for some time to come.  Despite 
these problems of proof, the upshot of this case is that more 
trademark attorneys will sleep soundly without having to worry 
about a guileless mistake resulting in cancellation of a client’s 
mark. 
 
 14 Bose, 580 F.3d at 1247. 
 15 See id. at 1242. 
 16 See id.  
 17 See id. at 1243 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006)). 
 18 See id. at 1245. 
 19 See id. 
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NUMBER 9: WILL THE UNITED STATES EVER RECOGNIZE ITS 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PARIS CONVENTION? 
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini Inc.20 
From its vigorous support of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)21 to 
the current push in favor of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA),22 the United States has been at the forefront 
of encouraging the effective protection of intellectual property 
rights worldwide.  This is hardly surprising since the United States 
is the largest producer of informational assets in the world and has 
reason to assure its citizens that those assets are protected abroad.  
Using ITC v. Punchgini as my frame of reference, I will discuss a 
departure from the general thrust of American policy in the 
international protection of what one might call “its first world 
assets.”23  I refer to the failure of United States law to create a 
coherent policy to protect well-known marks despite its treaty 
obligations under article 6bis of the Paris Convention.24  
Introduced at the Hague conference of 1925 and elaborated by 
TRIPS, article 6bis of the Paris Convention requires member 
countries to protect marks that are well-known in a member 
country.  It is generally recognized that countries must do so even 
though the well-known mark is neither registered nor used in the 
protecting country.25  United States case law is in disarray on this 
issue and, for the moment, there seems to be no interest to remedy 
 
 20 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 21 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 22 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Final Draft, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/ 
intellectual-property/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta/previous-acta-texts. 
 23 Frederick M. Abbot, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of 
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 77, 80 (2005). 
 24 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised 
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].  
 25 See id. 
C11_LEAFFER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  4:53 PM 
662 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:655 
the problem legislatively.  Some courts believe that the current 
provisions of the Lanham Act26 are sufficient to accommodate the 
well-known marks doctrine, but most courts do not. 
ITC v. Punchgini displays the exact problem mentioned above: 
the failure of United States law to create a coherent policy in the 
protection of well-known marks despite its treaty obligations under 
article 6bis of the Paris Convention.  In ITC, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s well-known mark for 
restaurant services, BURKARA, was abandoned and could not be 
enforced against the defendant’s similar mark, “Burkara Grill,” 
despite its continued use in India and other countries.27  The Court 
so ruled because neither the Paris Convention nor TRIPS is self-
executing in the United States, and no well-known marks doctrine 
had been enacted by Congress.28 
Would it be too much to hope for an amendment to the Lanham 
Act to take into account the protection of well-known marks as 
compared to our major trading partners?  At the least, other circuits 
should follow the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Grupo Gigante v. 
Dallo,29 which recognized the well-known marks doctrine in an 
action under section 43(a).30  In this case, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the well-known marks doctrine as an application of 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.31  Grupo Gigante, a Mexican 
Company, began operating a chain of supermarkets in Mexico 
under the name “Gigante” in 1962, and by 1991 had 100 stores in 
 
 26 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006).  
 27 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 28 Id. at 165.  Other courts within the Second Circuit have also rejected the view that 
the well-known marks doctrine was incorporated by the Lanham Act. See Almacenes 
Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that only Congress, and not the courts, can incorporate the well-known marks 
doctrine into the Lanham Act); Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that no rights in the mark FASHION CAFÉ were created when an Italian 
company advertised its restaurant in the United States). But see Empresa Cubana del 
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2005).  There, the Second Circuit 
expressly left open the possibility that protection would be available for well-known 
foreign marks if they were “sufficiently famous.” See id. at 480–81. 
 29 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 30 Id. at 1094. 
 31 Id. 
C11_LEAFFER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  4:53 PM 
2013] U.S. TRADEMARK LAW: A 20-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 663 
Mexico, six of them in Baja California (two in Tijuana).32  In 1991, 
Dallo opened a grocery store in San Diego, California under the 
name “Gigante Market.”  From 1999 to 2000, Grupo Gigante 
opened three stores in Los Angeles, California.  Grupo Gigante 
brought an action for infringement of its common law rights in the 
United States under section 43(a).  The court then faced two issues: 
1) whether a foreign trademark owner can sustain a cause of action 
in the United States as an exception to the territoriality principle;33 
and 2) if so, what degree of renown must be shown to sustain a 
cause of action under section 43(a)?34  The court declared that 
territoriality in trademark law is not absolute and when a mark 
reaches a certain exceptional level of notoriety overseas, the 
territorial principle can be overcome.35  In order to qualify for an 
exception to the territoriality principle, the foreign user must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial 
percentage of consumers in the relevant United States market are 
familiar with the foreign mark.36  The court based its decision on 
an interpretation of the Lanham Act, and rejected Grupo Gigante’s 
specific claims under the well-known marks doctrine of 6bis and 
unfair competition of 10bis of the Paris Convention.37 
The Grupo Gigante court took the right approach to the 
problem and its opinion should be the template for future decisions 
applying the well-known marks doctrine.  After all, one must take 
the territoriality principle with a grain of salt.  Despite its long 
standing recognition, the territoriality doctrine has never existed in 
a pure state, and has continued to give way in this twenty-year 
period as commerce and brand names continue to expand across 
national boundaries in a world structured by air travel, satellites, 
the internet, and the influx of immigrants into the United States. 
 
 32 Id. at 1091. 
 33 Id. at 1092. 
 34 Id. at 1093. 
 35 See id. at 1094. 
 36 See id. at 1098. 
 37 See id. at 1099–1100. 
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NUMBER 8: EXPANDING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 
McBee v. Delica Co.38 
McBee, chosen as case number eight on the list, stands for an 
even broader extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.  There, 
Cecil McBee was unable to enforce his rights against the use of his 
mark by a Japanese company selling girls clothing on the 
company’s Japanese language website.  More significantly the 
court adopted the Supreme Court’s standard as applied in the 
extraterritorial application of antitrust law in Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. California.39  In Hartford, the Court modified pre-
established precedent on the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act.  The Court restated the well-established principle 
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct “that was meant to 
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the 
United States.”40  The Court specified that Congress voiced no 
opinion on the issue “whether a court with Sherman Act 
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity.”41  Although the term “comity” 
was not at issue in this case, the court rejected the application of 
comity as being jurisdictional.42 
McBee extends Hartford to the extraterritorial application of 
trademark law.  Simply put, jurisdiction over foreign conduct will 
exist under the Lanham Act if that conduct produced some 
substantial effect in the United States.43  Moreover, once the 
substantial effect test is met, the court is to consider the question of 
comity as a prudential—not a jurisdictional—question of whether 
jurisdiction should be exercised.  With this holding, the court 
shunted to one side both Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,44 and Vanity 
 
 38 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 39 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 40 Id. at 796.  
 41 Id. at 798. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. at 796.  
 44 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
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Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.45  McBee is a significant case in 
articulating a more expansive standard for the extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act, an approach that I believe is well-
justified.  The intense flow of Internet commerce, unlike the reach 
of commerce twenty years ago, warrants a more expansive 
extraterritorial reach of United States trademark law. 
However, critics of this expansive extraterritorial application of 
United States trademark law warn against U.S. federal courts 
assuming the role of “the global court of commerce.”46  On the 
other hand, McBee acknowledges that Congress has little concern 
in applying United States trademark law where no substantial 
effects are felt in the United States.  Only when a substantial effect 
is felt in the United States may a court assert jurisdiction.47  Until 
foreign nations provide necessary protections through regulation 
and enforcement, far-reaching extraterritorial enforcement is 
necessary to prevent violators from “hid[ing] in countries without 
efficacious . . . trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority.”48  
Yet this is a doctrine that is still circumscribed by comity even 
when a substantial effect is felt in the Unites States, and the 
extraterritorial application of United States law must give way 
when true conflict between domestic and foreign law exists.  Here, 
courts may use comity considerations as a means to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction.49 
 
 45 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).  In following the lead of Steele v. Bulova, the court in 
Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co. articulated a tripartite test for the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. trademark law: “(1) the defendant’s conduct had a substantial effect 
on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was a United States citizen and the United 
States has a broad power to regulate the conduct of its U.S. citizens in foreign countries; 
and (3) there was no conflict with trademark rights established under the foreign law, 
since the defendant’s Mexican registration had been canceled by proceedings in Mexico.” 
Id. at 642.  The court denied jurisdiction in Vanity Fair Mills because only the first factor 
was present in the case. See id. 
 46 4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 29:58. 
 47 See Brendan J. Witherell, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham 
Act—The First Circuit Cuts the Fat from the Vanity Fair Test, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
193, 228 (2006). 
 48 McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 49 Id. at 120 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993)). 
C11_LEAFFER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  4:53 PM 
666 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:655 
NUMBER 7: BOUNDARY TENSIONS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox50 
The boundaries between trademark law and other intellectual 
property regimes are becoming less distinct and the same 
trademark-based cause of action will lend itself to multiple claims 
including copyright, patent, and various state causes of action.  It 
has always been this way as litigants, for strategic and other 
purposes, try to enlarge the scope of liability.  I believe these 
overlaps in intellectual property rights are a function both of the 
expanding subject matter scope of trademark law   and of the 
application of  likelihood of confusion concepts beyond the point-
of-sale   51 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,52 case 
number seven on the list, represents the inevitable tension that 
occurs as the scope of intellectual property rights progressively 
broadens.  There, Dastar released a World War II television series 
consisting largely of footage which was originally produced by a 
Fox affiliate and which had fallen into the public domain.53  Fox 
and its affiliates brought an action under the Lanham Act section 
43(a) on a reverse passing off theory54  for failure of the defendant 
to provide proper credit to the creator of the series.55  In finding for 
Dastar, the Court noted that if Dastar had bought the videotapes 
and then repackaged and sold them under its name, Fox’s claim 
undoubtedly would be sustained.56  But here, Justice Scalia pointed 
out that Dastar took a creative work in the public domain, copied 
 
 50 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 51 For an overview of the “likelihood of confusion” doctrine and the various non-point 
of sale confusion theories, see Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson Lalonde, The Lanham Act: 
Time for a Face Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013 (2002). 
 52 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 53 Id. at 23. 
 54 Passing off would occur when X places the Coke label on its non-Coke beverage.  
Reverse passing off occurs when X takes off the Coke label and replaces it with its own 
mark. 
 55 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 23. 
 56 Id. at 23–24. 
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it, modified it, and produced its own series of videotapes.57  In 
effect, according to the Court, a false designation of origin under 
the Lanham Act did not occur because Dastar was the “origin” of 
the goods under the language of the statute.58  While section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act prohibits actions that deceive consumers,59 it 
did not occur here. “The words of the Lanham Act should not be 
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to 
purchasers,” the court stated.60  Dastar’s importance lies in its 
minor upheaval of the scope of the Lanham Act to cover certain 
applications of the reverse confusion doctrine, such as the failure 
to properly provide artistic credit. 
Dastar’s ramifications, however, were felt well beyond the 
immediate concerns of trademark law’s doctrine of reverse passing 
off.  For example, when the United States joined the Berne 
Convention in March 1989, it did so without explicitly revising its 
copyright law to incorporate article 6bis of the Convention—the 
famous moral rights provision that was a major hurdle of United 
States participation in the Convention.61  Moral rights are a 
 
 57 Id. at 24. 
 58 Id. 
 59 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 60 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
 61 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis (Sept. 
9, 1886; revised July 24, 1971 and amended 1979; entered into force for U.S. Mar. 1, 
1989 (Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-27)) 1986 U.S.T. Lexis 160 or 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715.  Article 6bis 
reads: 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right 
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honor or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable 
by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the 
country where protection is claimed.  However, those countries 
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or 
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after 
the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his 
death, cease to be maintained. 
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centerpiece of legal regimes that view a work of authorship as an 
extension of the author’s personality.  The right of attribution is 
one of the author’s rights referred to as “moral rights” or droit 
moral.62  Accurate attribution, the right to be recognized as the 
author of a work, performs a trademark-like function in identifying 
both the source and the qualities of a work.63  The problem is that 
United States copyright law does not explicitly recognize a general 
right of attribution.64  To justify the entry of the United States into 
the Berne Convention, advocates of Berne membership argued that 
even though copyright law might fall short of fully recognizing 
aspects of the moral right, other areas of the law, notably 
trademark and unfair competition law, provided de facto 
protection.  Indeed, a number of cases have applied the reverse 
confusion doctrine to provide de facto protection of the attribution 
right.65  In Dastar, the United States Supreme Court threw into 
doubt the underlying rationale that the United States had 
incorporated specific recognition of the attribution right in 
copyright law to comply with Berne requirements.  Courts will be 
working out these issues relating to the more unconventional 
applications of section 43(a), such as the outer limits of the reverse 
confusion doctrine, for some time to come. 
 
Id. 
 62 See Betsey Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics (March 1998), http://cyber.law. 
harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html. 
 63 The United States did not have any express protection for a right of attribution until 
the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”). See 17 U.S.C. § 106A 
(2006).  For an overview of VARA and the attribution right, see Michael Landau, Dastar 
v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights In the 
United States, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273 (2005). 
 64 Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (Oct. 24, 1996), 
available at http://www.copyright. gov/reports/exsum.html. 
 65 See, e.g., PPX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(promoting the recordings of a band in which Jimi Hendrix was just a background 
musician was a 43(a) violation); Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 
516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Follett v. Arbor House Pub. Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(holding that Lanham Act, section 43(a) was violated where author’s name appears as 
primary author on book he did not write). 
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NUMBER 6: THE NEED FOR A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR FOR 
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Tiffany v. eBay Inc.66 
An online service provider (OSP) operates in a risky legal 
environment and is subject to potentially unlimited claims of both 
direct and contributory infringement by aggrieved copyright and 
trademark owners.67  OSPs are given special recognition under 
section 512 of the Copyright Act that erects a system of safe 
harbors if certain conditions are met by the OSP.68  Third party 
liability in trademark law is based on common law principles 
developed in the physical world in cases such as Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.69  I have chosen 
Tiffany v. eBay70 to illustrate the dilemma of the OSP in an action 
for contributory trademark infringement in the World Wide Web 
internet environment.  Tiffany noticed that a large number of 
Tiffany products offered for sale on the eBay website were 
counterfeit.71  Tiffany sued eBay under a number of theories, one 
of which was contributory infringement.72  Tiffany argued that 
eBay had a general awareness that the auction items posted as 
Tiffany jewelry were likely to be counterfeit, and, as a result, eBay 
bore the duty to prevent the sale of these bogus products.73  In 
affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of eBay, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit defined the “two ways in which a 
defendant may become contributorially liable for the infringing 
conduct of another: first, if the service provider ‘intentionally 
induces another to infringe a trademark,’ and second, if the service 
 
66 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 67 See, e.g., id. 
 68 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).  
 69 456 U.S. 844 (1982). The Court articulated the standard of contributory 
infringement as follows: “Thus if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces 
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or 
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.” Id. at 
854. 
 70 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 71 See id. at 97. 
 72 Id. at 103. 
 73 Id. at 106. 
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provider ‘continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or 
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.’”74  
Here, inducement was not an issue and the court rejected the 
argument that contributory infringement could be based on the fact 
that eBay had only generalized knowledge of some counterfeit 
goods being listed on its website.75 
The court held that “[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which 
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is 
necessary” for liability under a cause of action for contributory 
infringement.76  eBay, according to the court, must have had 
“[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which listings are infringing 
or will infringe in the future.”77  In this situation, Tiffany’s demand 
letters were not sufficiently precise, and those that did contain 
detailed information of the counterfeit sales were honored by eBay. 
Tiffany is not a total win for OSPs when one considers the 
court’s standard for liability in the case of “willful blindness.”  
When an OSP has reason to suspect “that users of its service are 
infringing a protected mark it may not shield itself from learning of 
the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.”78  
The problem with this willful blindness standard is that it fails to 
specify the basis as to what constitutes “reason to suspect” that 
users are infringing.  In this case eBay prevailed, but OSPs will be 
pursued with increasing intensity under third party liability claims 
for contributory infringement for the foreseeable future.  There is a 
paucity of decisions dealing with third party liability in the use of 
trademarks in an Internet context, which is likely to change.  
Because eBay is one the first major decisions on this issue, we 
need a safe harbor provision in trademark law much like section 
512 of the Copyright Act.79 
 
 74 Id. (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854).   
 75 Id. at 107. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at 109. 
 79 See Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory 
Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Problem, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 911 (2005). 
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NUMBER 5: THE MUDDLED MESS OF DILUTION LAW 
V Secret Catalogue Inc. v. Moseley80 
The federal dilution cause of action is a major development in 
trademark law of the last twenty years, with the first version of the 
1995 dilution statute widely considered a mess.  The 1995 version 
of section 43(c) provided that the owner a famous mark was 
entitled to injunctive relief against another person’s commercial 
use of a mark or trade name if that use “causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality” of the famous mark.  Courts were split over 
whether that language created a likelihood of dilution standard or 
an actual dilution standard.  The ruling in Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc.81 resolved the split by finding that section 43(c) 
required a showing of “actual dilution.”  Unfortunately, the court 
gave little guidance of what would constitute actual dilution.  
There are a lot of problems with the dilution cause of action but the 
Supreme Court’s opinion rendered another level of complexity to 
this problematical cause of action.  United States Congress 
responded to V Secret Catalogue with surprising alacrity, and its 
most prominent change required that dilution liability follow from 
a showing of likelihood of dilution.  The 2006 amendments to the 
dilution provisions were a necessary improvement, but 
fundamental questions of proof of dilution by blurring and 
tarnishment continue to plague the courts. 
 I have chosen the Sixth Circuit case V Secret Catalogue v. 
Mosley82 to illustrate the muddle we find ourselves in when 
developing consistent rules for trademark dilution.  In fact, I 
believe that the majority opinion in this case is clearly wrong.  This 
case is part of the continuing saga of Victoria’s Secret, the famous 
lingerie store, against a small-town retail store based in Kentucky 
that sold sex-related products.  The district court found that even 
though the parties did not compete in the same market, the 
Kentucky sex shop had diminished the positive associations and 
the selling power of the Victoria’s Secret mark.83 
 
80 V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 81 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 82 605 F.3d 382. 
 83 Id. at 384–85. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the 
activities of the defendant constituted actionable dilution by 
tarnishment.84  The court concluded that the 2006 Act “creates a 
kind of rebuttable presumption, or at a least a very strong 
inference, that a new mark used to sell sex-related products is 
likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic 
association between the two.”85 
The court ruled that there is a strong inference that the mark 
“Victor’s Little Secret” was likely to tarnish the famous “Victoria’s 
Secret” mark because of a semantic association between the two 
marks.86  But most importantly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the novelty shop failed to rebut the probability that some 
consumers would find the shop’s mark both offensive and harmful 
to the reputation and the favorable symbolism associated with 
Victoria Secret’s mark.87  The court’s decision that any sexual 
connotation disparages a famous mark and creates a rebuttable 
presumption of dilution is nowhere to be found in the statute and 
is, in my opinion, downright wrong as a matter of law.  V Secret 
Catalogue does not augur well for the predictability of a dilution 
cause of action. 
Now scholars might ask, “will we need another amendment to 
the dilution provisions?”  Perhaps, but for the moment there are no 
burning issues that need emergency attention.  On the other hand, 
many basic questions that involve the proof of factual matters as 
the multifactor test to prove fame88 and blurring89 will generate 
substantial litigation. 
 
 84 See id. at 389; see also 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006) (“For purposes of 
paragraph (1), “dilution by tarnishment” is association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous 
mark.”). 
 85 V Secret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 385. 
86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 388–89. 
 88 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if 
it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.  In determining 
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all 
relevant factors, including the following: 
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NUMBER 4: THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF DEFENSES TO AN ACTION FOR 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
Louis Vuitton v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC90 
To establish liability for trademark infringement, the owner of 
a mark must demonstrate that the third party use of his mark is 
actionable under the Lanham Act.91  Not all unauthorized uses of 
another’s mark are actionable under a cause of action for dilution 
or likelihood of confusion.  One such category of permissible use 
falls under the term “fair use,” an imprecise catch-all term for a 
variety of related doctrines.  Fair use as a defense is specifically 
recognized in section 1115(b)(4),92 which provides a fair use 
defense to a party whose “use of the . . . term . . . charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term . . . 
 
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and 
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner 
or third parties. 
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or 
services offered under the mark. 
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. 
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.”). 
 89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (“For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by 
blurring” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.  In determining 
whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may 
consider all relevant factors, including the following: 
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the 
famous mark. 
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous 
mark. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in 
substantially exclusive use of the mark. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. 
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an 
association with the famous mark. 
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the 
famous mark.”). 
90 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
 91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 92 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
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which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to 
describe the goods or services.”93  In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. 
v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,94 the owner of the incontestable 
trademark MICRO COLORS, which is used to describe a 
permanent mark-up pigment, sued Lasting for its use of 
“microcolors” on a similar product.  The court held that the 
plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable mark must 
show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of the prima facie 
case.95  Once confusion is shown, defendant may then assert that 
the mark was used fairly under the statutory definition.   
KP Permanent is a revealing case that shows the difficulty in 
reconciling the issue of consumer confusion with the need of third 
parties to reference the plaintiff’s mark.  In my opinion, KP 
Permanent is a case that establishes an ambiguous message in 
trademark law; specifically, on the one hand, it rejected the 
proposition that a fair use proponent prove absence of likelihood of 
confusion, and on the other hand, the court refused to hold that 
likelihood of confusion is irrelevant to the fair use defense.  We 
find this type of tension running prevalently throughout the 
assertion of affirmative defenses to action for trademark 
infringement. 
I have chosen Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity 
Dog, LLC as case number four because it represents one of several 
cases that tackle the thorny question of defenses and other 
limitations to a cause of action in dilution.96  In particular, Vuitton 
is useful in illustrating the role of parody in both an action for 
likelihood of confusion and also for a cause of action in dilution.  
In this case, the Nevada-based company Haute Diggity Dog sold a 
line of pet chew toys and beds under various amusing names such 
as “Chewy Vuitton.”97  Vuitton sued Haute Diggity Dog under 
various claims including an action for likelihood of confusion and 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 543 U.S. 111 (2004).  
 95 Id. at 112. 
 96 Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 258 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
97  Id. at 256. 
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dilution.98  In regards to likelihood of confusion claim, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s 
assessment that because the “Chewy Vuitton” line of chew toys 
successfully parodied the famous luxury handbag brand, no 
likelihood of confusion existed as a matter of law.99  The court 
concluded that the likelihood of confusion factors favored the 
defendant and that the “Chewy Vuitton” dog toys conveyed “just 
enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate 
the point of the parody.”100 
The plaintiff fared no better in its dilution claim.  To determine 
whether a junior mark is likely to dilute a famous mark through 
blurring, the statute enumerates six factors that the court must take 
into account.101  Here the court found that three of those factors 
favored the plaintiff, including: (2) the strength of Vuitton’s mark; 
(3) the substantially exclusive use of the Vuitton mark; and (4) the 
renown of the Vuitton mark all favored plaintiff.102  On the other 
hand, factors (1) the similarity between the marks; (5) the intent of 
the use by the junior user; and (6) actual association, favored the 
defendant.103  In finding for the defendant, the court emphasized 
the use of parody, which negated the blurring action.104 
The court did not apply parody as an affirmative defense, 
which is specifically incorporated into section 43(c).105  Under the 
statute, the dilution cause of action is excluded when a mark is 
used in “any fair use . . . of a famous mark by another person other 
than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services, including use in connection with . . . identifying, 
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark.”106  Section 
43(c)(3)(A) shields a defendant’s fair use, but only where the 
defendant is using the mark “other than as a designation of 
source.”  Yet, the Vuitton court concluded that the defendant’s use 
 
98  Id.  
99  Id. at 256–57. 
 100 Id. at 261.  
 101 See supra note 89 (listing the six factors). 
102 Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 266. 
103 Id. at 266. 
104 Id. at 267. 
105 Id. at 266. 
 106 15 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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of the famous mark failed to satisfy that limitation.107  Although 
the court did not employ parody as a fair use defense, it constantly 
alluded to parody as an element that disproved the likelihood of 
dilution.108  In applying the dilution factors, the court found that 
even though the defendant’s mark was used on related goods, the 
mark, when used as a parody, may be good evidence in negating a 
cause of action of dilution by blurring.109 
As I stated above, the courts have had a problem with relating 
permissible use doctrines—such as parody and other varieties of 
fair use—with doctrines of confusion and dilution.  In Vuitton, the 
court was willing to use parody as a threshold consideration in 
both the consumer confusion and dilution analyses, which I view 
as the court’s willingness to act as a harbinger for a broader 
acceptance of permissible uses in trademark law.  I predict that 
permissible uses and defenses will play a greater role in the future, 
and in particular, provide the needed safety valve against the 
imperialism of unbridled dilution causes of action.110 
NUMBER 3: TRADEMARKS ON THE INTERNET—THE NEW REALISM 
Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts111 
In 1992, less than two percent of the United States’ population 
habitually used the Internet; today that number approaches eighty 
percent.112  The average Internet user is increasingly savvy in on-
line consumer transactions.  The case law has progressively 
reflected the evolution in our thinking by recognizing the realities 
 
107 Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 268. 
108 Id. at 268. 
109  Id. 
 110 See e.g., Mattel, Inc.. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003) (holding the song title “Barbie Girl” in song did not 
mislead as to source under section 43(a) where a title has artistic relevance to the 
underlying work and that the  song title fell within the non-commercial liability 
exemption to dilution under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act).  
111 Network Automation Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 112 See Internet Users as a Percentage of the Population, WORLD BANK data 
republished at http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_ 
y=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:USA&dl=en&hl=en&q=internet+usage+statistics. 
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of consumer behavior in the online Internet environment.  By 
comparison, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corp.113 mirrored an earlier view of naïve 
consumers bewitched by the new Internet medium.  For example, 
in Brookfield the court declared that, “[i]n the internet context . . . 
entering a web site takes little effort . . . thus web surfers are more 
likely to be confused as to the ownership of a [w]eb site than 
traditional patrons of a brick and mortar store.”114  And the court 
spun a theory of initial interest confusion by using a dubious 
analogy to the physical world: “using another’s trademark . . . is 
much like posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s 
store.”115 
In addition, the court declared that in proving likelihood of 
confusion on the Internet, the first three factors previously 
mentioned (which came to be known as the Internet troika)116 of 
the Sleekcraft117 test were the most important factors for proving 
likelihood of confusion on the internet.  These factors are: (1) the 
similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the goods or services; 
and (3) the simultaneous use of the World Wide Web as a 
marketing channel, to be taken into account for any case 
addressing trademark infringement on the Internet.118  It later 
became apparent that the courts should not inflexibly enshrine 
three likelihood of confusion factors for all infringements taking 
place in an internet context.  In sum, case law in the 1990s created 
a curious set of legal principles based on assumptions about the 
online marketplace that no longer exists, or possibly never did.   
Clearly, it was time for a reassessment more consistent with actual 
practice. 
 
 113 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 114 Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036 at 1057. 
 115 Id. at 1064. 
 116 See id. at 1067 n.16. 
 117 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) for the 
Ninth Circuit’s multifactor test.  The likelihood of confusion test considers the following 
factors: 1) similarity of the marks; 2) relatedness of the goods and services offered; 3) 
overlapping marketing and advertising facilities; 4) the strength of the registered 
trademark; 5) intent; 6) evidence of actual confusion; 7) likelihood of expansion in 
product lines; and 8) purchaser care. See id. 
118  See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1067 n.16 (stating the importance and reason behind 
starting the analysis with these three factors). 
C11_LEAFFER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  4:53 PM 
678 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:655 
Much has changed since Brookfield.  This evolution in thinking 
about trademark law and the internet is illustrated by the case I 
consider third most significant: Network Automation, Inc. v. 
Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.119  Network Automation involved 
a claim of likelihood of confusion in a Google AdWords context—
the acquisition of a competitor’s trademark as trigger for its search 
engine advertisements.  The court, in vacating a preliminary 
injunction, emphasized that the Brookfield Internet troika factors 
are not necessarily the factors most important to every case 
involving likelihood of confusion on the Internet.120  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals also differed with Brookfield on Internet 
consumer behavior, stating that “the default degree of consumer 
care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of the internet 
evaporates and online commerce becomes commonplace.”121  
Network Automation is one of several cases recognizing the real 
world of Internet marketing and the increasing sophistication of 
consumers in their online activities.  As Judge Kosinski 
summarized in Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari: 
[I]n the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 
lines, reasonable, prudent and experienced internet 
consumers are accustomed to such exploration by 
trial and error.  They skip from site to site, ready to 
hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied 
with a site’s contents.  They fully expect to find 
some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a 
glance at the domain name or search engine 
summary.  Outside the special case of . . . domains 
that actively claim affiliation with the trademark 
holder, consumers don’t form any firm expectations 
about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve 
seen the landing page—if then.122 
 
119  638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 120 “Given the multifaceted nature of the Internet and the ever-expanding ways in which 
we all use the technology, however, it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors 
for every type of potential online commercial activity.” Id. at 1148. 
121  Id. at 1152. 
 122 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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More realistic notions of the reasonably prudent purchaser on 
the Internet marketplace are finally being given recognition in the 
courts.  Much as in copyright law, the way the courts have reacted 
to changing technological trends in trademark law illustrates once 
again that legal change lags behind social change. 
NUMBER 2: OF TRADE DRESS AND PRODUCT CONFIGURATION AND 
OTHER NON-VERBAL MARKS 
Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, Inc.123 
The variety of non-verbal trademarks acknowledged by the 
courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has 
continued to enlarge during the twenty-year time frame covered in 
this retrospective.  Logos and packaging have long been protected 
under trademark and unfair competition law.  But in the last two 
decades the courts and the PTO have also recognized and protected 
color, product designs, fragrances, and other symbols.  This 
expansion of trademark law into more non-traditional subject 
matter reflects, I believe, the changing nature of how consumers 
have come to identify and distinguish a product by its form and 
packaging.  As Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out, “Courts have 
protected as trade dress the design features of an extensive range of 
products including kitchen appliances, sporting equipment, 
candies, bathroom fittings, sports cars, giant gumball machines, 
furniture, hardware items, fashion accessories, lamps and even golf 
holes.”124  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has served as the 
statutory medium for this broad expansion of trademark subject 
matter under the rubric of “trade dress,” a term used to refer to 
product packaging in its multitudinous forms. 125 
 
123 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 124 Graeme Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: a Teleological Approach to Trademark 
Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (collecting cases). 
 125 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides: “(a) Civil action (1) Any person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
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In 1992, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.126 was fresh on 
everybody’s mind as a case that significantly enlarged the scope of 
protection for trade dress.  Taco Cabana operated a chain of 
Mexican restaurants, and described its trade dress as “a festive 
eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio area decorated 
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings, and murals.”127 Taco 
Cabana brought suit against Two Pesos under section 43(a) for 
infringement of its trade dress.  The question before the court was 
whether trade dress could be protected absent secondary 
meaning.128  In Two Pesos, the Court held that proof of secondary 
meaning is not required to prevail on a claim under section 43(a) 
where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive.129  By 
allowing trade dress to be protected without a secondary meaning 
filter, the risk of overprotecting an amorphous category of 
trademark subject of indeterminate boundaries was created.  
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co. Inc. recognized the 
necessity for some restraint on the ever-expanding contours of 
trademark subject matter. 130  There, the court held that color alone 
can meet the basic requirements as a trademark and can serve as a 
 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities 
by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 126 505 U.S. 763 (1992).  
 127 Id. at 765 (citing Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 
(5th Cir. 1991)). 
 128 Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress “has come 
through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990).  “To establish secondary 
meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary 
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.” Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 
844, 851 n.11 (1982). 
 129 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.  
 130 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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symbol that identifies and distinguishes a firm’s goods so long as 
that color has attained a secondary meaning.131 
I have chosen Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers as case 
number two on this list because of the increasing importance of the 
protection of trade dress and product design (and other non-
traditional trademarks) under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  In 
Wal-Mart, by distinguishing product design from trade dress and 
packaging, the Court cut back on the progressive broadening of 
rights in this domain.  Specifically, Samara Brothers brought suit 
under section 43(a) for the imitation of its line of children’s 
clothing consisting of seersucker fabric and gold appliqués.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Samara, whose 
product design was deemed protectable as being inherently 
distinctive even though it had not attained a secondary meaning.  
The Court ruled that product design, like product color, is not 
capable of being inherently distinctive.  The point is that product 
design (unlike trade dress/packaging) serves purposes other than 
source identification.  Thus, allowing product design to be 
protected without proof of secondary meaning would harm to 
consumer interests.  The Court rejected the application of an 
inherent distinctiveness test for product design, stating that “such a 
test would rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an 
anticompetitive strike suit.”132  The Court added that 
“[c]ompetition is deterred . . . not merely by successful suit but the 
plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of 
inherently source identifying design, the game of allowing suit 
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth 
the candle.”133   
But Wal-Mart did not tie up all the loose ends.  One thorny 
question that has plagued the courts is the distinction between trade 
dress/packaging and product design.  Wal-Mart can be read in 
conjunction with Qualitex v. Jacobsen, Dastar, and Traffix as 
Supreme Court cases that attempt to strike a balance between third 
party competitive entry into markets, and the protection of a 
 
 131 Id. at 174. 
 132 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. 
 133 Id.  
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trademark owner’s goodwill.  This is a difficult task, but one that 
will always occupy the courts.  I believe, however, that the courts 
have properly struck the balance in favor of competitive entry, 
absent a showing of secondary meaning on the part of the owner of 
a non-verbal, non-traditional trademark. 
NUMBER 1: TRYING TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THE FUNCTIONALITY 
DOCTRINE 
 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.134 
One who seeks to register and protect a product or container 
configuration as a trademark must prove that its design is “non-
functional and that the design is distinctive.”135  As recently 
discussed in Samara, certain forms of trade dress—packaging—
can be protected as inherently distinctive without proof of 
secondary meaning under the appropriate circumstances.  The 
second important step in determining product and trade dress is the 
doctrine of functionality.  In Qualitex v. Jacobsen Products, the 
Supreme Court explained the functionality doctrine in the 
following manner: 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, 
which seeks to promote competition by protecting a 
firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a 
useful product feature.  It is the province of patent 
law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by 
granting inventors a monopoly over new product 
designs or functions for a limited time . . . after 
which competitors are free to use the innovation.  If 
a product’s functional features could be  used as 
trademarks, however, a monopoly over such 
features could be obtained without regard to 
whether they qualify as patents and could be 
 
134  532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 135 In re Morton-Norwich Products Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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extended forever (because trademarks may be 
renewed in perpetuity).136 
Before the TrafFix decision in 2001, the courts had developed a 
practical standard for determining functionality based on whether 
the product feature was needed in order to compete.137  The 
functionality doctrine was best articulated in In re Morton-Norwich 
Products, Inc.138  In this case, Judge Rich listed four evidentiary 
criteria to determine whether a product feature is de jure 
functional: (1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the 
utilitarian advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in 
which the originator of the design touts the design’s utilitarian 
advantages; (3) the availability to competitors of functionally 
equivalent designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results 
in a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the 
product.139 
I have chosen TrafFix as my number one case for essentially 
negative reasons.  I have come to intensely dislike this case not so 
much for the Court’s perhaps well-intentioned goal to render some 
certainty to the functionality doctrine, but instead for the 
unintelligible, incoherent way the Court went about its task.  The 
doctrine of functionality was already one of the most challenging 
and befuddling doctrines in trademark law even before the 
Supreme Court added another layer of needless confusion in 
TrafFix. 
In TrafFix, the Court ruled that the respondent’s trade dress on 
a spring mounted wind resistant sign stand, which was used in 
traffic control and construction work zones, was functional.140  
What is puzzling is not the actual decision but how the Court 
imposed a new “bright line” rule in determining the issue of 
 
 136 Qualitex v. Jacobsen Products, 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995). 
 137 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17 (1995) (“A design . . . is 
‘functional’ if the particular design affords benefits to the person marketing the goods or 
services, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance as an indication 
of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that are unavailable 
through the use of alternative designs.”).  
 138 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A 1982). 
 139 Id. at 1340–41. 
 140 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001). 
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functionality.  Even before defining the functionality standard, the 
TrafFix Court was eager to establish a new bright line rule to 
determine functionality based on the presence of a utility patent.  
The Court held that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the 
features therein claimed are functional.  If trade dress protection is 
sought for those feature the strong evidence of functionality based 
on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory 
presumption that features are deemed functional until proved 
otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.”141  
The problem with the Court’s approach in this case is that it 
seems to overemphasize the presence of a utility patent in the 
analysis of functionality.  Ultimately, the determination should be 
based on a competitive need, and the presence of a utility patent, 
by itself, provides no evidence of the competitive significance of 
the features claimed.  Patents are sometimes granted for obscure 
inventions of non-existent commercial value.  Other patents are 
allowed for slight advances over the prior art and are narrow in 
scope.  In addition, many patents lapse, sometimes abandoned by 
their owners for failure to pay periodically required maintenance 
fees before their expiration dates.  In placing the mere presence of 
a patent as the centerpiece in the analysis of functionality, the court 
misses the important policy reason for the doctrine—one that is 
based on competitive need.  The presence of a patent may or may 
not be important in determining circumstantial functionality, but it 
still should not be used as a bright line rule.  Despite this point, the 
court continues to argue this fact in a totally aberrant manner, and 
whether satisfactory alternatives exist is not relevant to the 
discussion.142 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in TrafFix to resolve a 
minor split in circuits involving the relevance of an expired utility 
patent on the issue of functionally, yet ultimately ended up 
rewriting the entire law of functionality in an incoherent manner.143  
 
 141 Id. at 29–30. 
 142 See id. at 33–34.  
 143 Compare Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that trade dress protection is not foreclosed by utility patent); Thomas & Betts 
Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); and Midwest Indus., Inc. v. 
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (same), with Vornado Air 
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In so doing, it jettisoned the uniform use of a competitive need 
functionality standard, and ditched the consistent treatment of all 
functionality questions, whether aesthetic or utilitarian.144  In sum, 
the court rendered an inherently difficult doctrine that was more 
perplexing, less intelligible, and less predictable than the 
original.145  The mischief of TrafFix can be found in the muddled 
post-TrafFix case law, and it will take a long time to undo the 
confusion created by this poorly crafted decision.146 
For some time now, a number of scholars have addressed the 
issue of functionality in academic literature.  What is remarkable 
about the discussion is that after all the many years of discussion, 
hardly any consensus has developed on the doctrine of 
functionality.  During the twenty years of this retrospective, 
scholars and courts differ on its underlying rationale and scope.  In 
the future, they should focus on a uniform coherent practical test to 
prove functionality in the litigation process, one that supports its 
underlying competitive market rationale. 
CONCLUSION 
In adapting to a new marketing environment, trademark law 
has seen more change in the last twenty years than in any time in 
its history.  These ten cases were chosen as vehicles to illustrate 
 
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Where a 
product configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention covered by a 
utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade dress protection . . . .”). 
 144 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.  It is proper to inquire into a “significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage” in cases of aesthetic functionality, the question involved in TrafFix.  
Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed 
further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.  In Qualitex, by 
contrast, aesthetic functionality was the central question, there having been no indication 
that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose 
of the product or its cost or quality. 
 145 See Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality 
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. Rev. 243, 326 (2004). 
 146 Some courts have appeared to ignore TrafFix. See, e.g., Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord 
Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We do not understand the Supreme 
Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich analysis.”); Eppendorf-
Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A design or 
characteristic is nonfunctional if there are reasonably effective and efficient alternatives 
possible.”). 
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the challenges that courts and Congress have had in negotiating 
and adapting to current challenges.  These challenges can be 
summed up as globalization and the expansion of Internet use.  By 
reflecting on this two-decade time period, I am impressed by the 
relatively sensible nature that both the courts and Congress have 
taken to reconcile difficult issues.  There have been plenty of 
judicial bumps in road, and we still need to work out the thorny 
issues of dilution law and reconcile the boundaries between 
trademark and patent law.  Yet on the whole, the journey has been 
a laudatory adaptation.  I look forward to the next twenty years of 
the Fordham Conference in which we will debate the new issues 
that await us in the world of trademark law. 
 
